In easy sectors, investors enter when they see rapid growth.
However, in the aviation sector, the entry itself is a heavy economic question: why would a country establish a full-service airline at a time when global companies are merging, cutting costs, and restructuring?

This is the angle that Omar Al-Juraisi opens regarding Riyadh Air. The discussion here is not just about a new aircraft, a new logo, or a maiden flight, but a deeper question: how does a country prevent the value it creates from leaking away?

Saudi Arabia today is not building airports and airlines in isolation from the economy. It is building tourism demand, hosting conferences, preparing for Expo 2030, the 2034 World Cup, and redefining Riyadh's position on the regional business map. In this case, aviation becomes less like an independent sector and more like an economic artery: if you do not own or manage it with sufficient capability, part of its revenues will flow to others.

A Ruthless Sector: Why is Aviation One of the Toughest Industries?

Aviation is an attractive industry from the outside, but harsh from the inside. A plane full of passengers does not necessarily mean a profitable company. Behind every flight are fuel costs, aircraft financing, maintenance, airport fees, operating crews, price fluctuations, fierce competition, and high sensitivity to geopolitical and health crises.

Therefore, Al-Juraisi's observation seems important: the world is not experiencing a major wave of establishing full-service airlines, but has witnessed waves of mergers, exits, and bankruptcies over the past decades. In the United States, major mergers have reshaped the sector, such as the merger of United and Continental in 2010, followed by the announcement of the merger of American Airlines and US Airways in 2013. In Europe, the story was not much different; Swissair collapsed at the beginning of the millennium, and then Swiss later merged into the Lufthansa Group, while the Air France–KLM group was formed through a historic merger in 2004.

The economic implication is simple: aviation is not a sector that capital enters easily just out of enthusiasm. It is a sector that requires a long financial breath, the ability to absorb early losses, and a vision that goes beyond the profitability of the first or second year.

And here the role of the sovereign fund emerges.

Why the Sovereign Fund and Not the Private Sector?

In economics, there is a difference between a project that the market wants and a project that the economy needs.
The private sector often seeks a clear return within a predictable time frame. However, the sovereign fund can, when national interest is clear, enter sectors that do not seem attractive at first but open broader value for the economy.

Riyadh Air falls precisely in this area. Not because it is a guaranteed profit project, but because it is a project that the private sector alone would find difficult to initiate at the required scale, speed, and capability.

Establishing a global airline today means reserving aircraft years in advance, building operational teams, obtaining route rights, developing travel experiences, and linking them to a system of airports, tourism, events, and investments. This is not a traditional company that starts with a small line and then grows slowly. It is an infrastructure bet on a country's position in the global economy.

Thus, the phrase “three years until operation” is not just about speed of execution, but an indicator of institutional capability: decision-making, financing, coordination, and execution under significant time pressure.

The First Gain: Entering a Shrinking Sector That is Not Expanding

The first gain in Al-Juraisi's proposal is that Saudi Arabia is entering a sector that the world is not racing to enter in the traditional way. The last full-service Gulf airline that created a wide regional transformation was Etihad Airways, which was established in 2003. Since then, the global aviation scene has become more cautious, not more impulsive.

Why is this important?

Because establishing a full-service airline in 2026 is not like establishing a digital app or an e-commerce company. Here, it is not enough for demand to exist. A network, aircraft, a hub airport, operating rights, capital, and long patience must be available. Therefore, the entry of Riyadh Air should not be read as a separate commercial decision, but as part of a strategy for transport, logistics, and tourism.

In other words: Saudi Arabia is not entering aviation because the sector is easy, but because it cannot leave it to others while it creates a massive wave of demand within its borders.

The Second Gain: Capturing Value Before It Leaks

The most important economic idea is “value leakage.”
Simply put, it means that a country creates demand within its economy, but a significant portion of the revenue goes to foreign companies because they have the ability to transport passengers.

Let’s imagine the equation:
Saudi Arabia hosts Expo, organizes conferences, attracts regional headquarters, expands tourism, and builds major projects. All of this creates millions of potential flights. But if there is not enough air capacity, visitors will come through other companies, may book through external transit hubs, and spend part of the trip's value in another economy.

Here, the airline is not just a carrier. It becomes a tool for capturing value.

In this case, aviation does not only profit from the ticket. Its impact extends to hotels, restaurants, exhibitions, supply chains, airport services, employment, and tourism spending. Every additional direct flight to Riyadh, Jeddah, AlUla, or the Red Sea is not just a sold seat; it is a potential expenditure within the local economy.

This is what makes Riyadh Air part of a broader economic policy: preventing the opportunities generated by Saudi Arabia from turning into revenues for neighboring airlines only.

The Third Gain: Competition that Improves the Internal Landscape

The third gain in Al-Juraisi's proposal is more sensitive: the entry of Riyadh Air may accelerate the transformation of Saudi Airlines.

This is not a condemnation of Saudi Airlines, but a reading of a historical burden. The company has been tasked with multiple roles simultaneously: domestic service with a social dimension, transporting pilgrims and Umrah performers, international operations, tourism service, connecting regions, and national representation. When all these tasks are combined within one company, transformation becomes more difficult, not because efficiency is absent, but because the goals are crowded.

The presence of Riyadh Air may create a clearer distribution of roles. Riyadh needs a global carrier that serves its position as a business and events hub. Jeddah, Medina, and Mecca need a strong system that serves pilgrimage, Umrah, tourism, and internal connectivity. Over time, organized competition can push everyone to improve the experience, control costs, develop services, and clarify the operational identity of each carrier.

Competition here is not a zero-sum game. It can be a tool for reorganization.

What Should Be Monitored?

The success of Riyadh Air is not measured by the initial buzz, but by clear operational and financial indicators. The most important of these are:

First: Load Factor
The ratio of seats sold to total available seats. An airline that cannot fill its seats consistently will face rapid pressure on its margins.

Second: Revenue per Seat
It is not just the number of passengers that matters, but the average revenue the company generates from each seat. Some routes may be full but low in profitability.

Third: On-time Performance
In aviation, time is part of the product. Delayed flights not only harm reputation but also increase costs and weaken trust.

Fourth: Quality of Connections
A successful carrier does not sell a separate flight, but a network. The strength of Riyadh Air will show when passing through Riyadh becomes a logical choice between continents and cities, not just a flight from point to point.

Fifth: Integration with Tourism and Events
If the company succeeds in turning major events into a continuous flow of travelers, it will have captured the value that Al-Juraisi spoke about. If the movement remains seasonal or dependent on support, the model will need to be reviewed.

The Aircraft is Not the Event… The Network is the Event

The historical moment in Riyadh Air does not lie in the takeoff of the first flight alone. The takeoff is a symbol. The real event is that Saudi Arabia is trying to build a network that captures a larger share of the value it creates.

In the modern economy, it is not enough to own the event, destination, or project. You must own the road to it. Those who do not own the road leave part of the revenue to those who have the ability to access it.

Omar Al-Juraisi's proposal highlights this point: Riyadh Air is not a luxury project, nor just an addition to the market. It is a test of Saudi Arabia's ability to convert the demand arising from Vision 2030 into measurable local value.

In two or three years, the question will not be: Did the company launch?
But rather: How much value has the Saudi economy retained because this company launched at the right time?