Can hypermarkets transform into a model similar to discount stores?

The closest answer is: no, at least not completely.
Hypermarkets and discount stores do not offer the same product in the same way, nor do they target the consumer with the same value.
However, the rise of discount stores puts the traditional hypermarket model to a tough test:
Can it continue with large spaces, a wide assortment, and high operating costs, while consumers have become more capable of comparing prices and less willing to pay differences they do not understand?

Here lies the real problem.
The threat does not necessarily mean the disappearance of hypermarkets, but a decline in their ability to operate under the same old logic.

When price became transparent

In the past, price differences between stores were less clear to consumers.
Moving between stores took time, and comparing dozens of products was a tiring process.
Therefore, some stores were able to achieve higher margins on certain items, benefiting from location, a wide assortment, customer trust, and the difficulty of direct comparison.

Today, prices have become more transparent.
Consumers can view offers through apps and digital platforms, and compare the price of the same item in multiple stores within minutes. The spread of discount stores has also established a reference price in the customer's mind; that is, the price they believe is fair and acceptable for the product.

This shift puts pressure on the 'profit margin', which is the difference between the cost of purchasing the item and its selling price before accounting for other expenses.
The more the customer knows the available price in the market, the more limited the store's ability to add a high margin without clear value becomes.

Discount stores are not just stores selling at lower prices

It is a mistake to view discount stores as hypermarkets offering bigger discounts. Lower prices are not a temporary campaign, but a result of a different operating model.

This model typically relies on fewer items, more efficient spaces, limited decor, fewer services, fast inventory turnover, and strict negotiations with suppliers.
It may also allow for more space for private labels; products manufactured for the store and sold under its name, giving it broader control over price and margin.

Therefore, competition does not start at the price tag placed on the shelf.
It starts much earlier:
from choosing the supplier, the number of items, package size, transportation costs, store space, number of employees, and the speed of getting the product out of the warehouse.

Here, the advantage of the 'merchant mentality' emerges.
A professional merchant does not just ask: what are the branch sales?
But asks:
How much does each meter earn?
How often does the inventory move?
What items attract the customer?
And which products consume space and capital without sufficient return?

A struggle between the economy of goods and the economy of space

The upcoming competition can be described as a struggle between those who manage goods and those who manage space.

The large hypermarket model partially arose around the power of location, the vast space, and providing everything under one roof. However, the large space that was once an advantage can become a burden when rents, energy, labor, and storage costs rise, or when certain departments do not achieve sales that match the space allocated to them.

In contrast, the discount merchant starts from the economy of the goods themselves:
selecting a limited number of products, pressing the cost of purchasing them, reducing their time on the shelf, and reinvesting the savings into price or expansion.

This is why merchants who understand the details of purchasing, inventory, and pricing often have an advantage over operators who primarily rely on location, space, and visitor density.
This is not an absolute rule, but it illustrates why brand strength or store size is not enough to protect profits.

Will hypermarkets imitate their competitors?

It is likely that hypermarkets will not fully transform into discount stores, as that may cause them to lose their distinguishing elements:
the wide assortment, multiple services, fresh products, family shopping experience, and the ability to gather diverse needs in one visit.

However, they may move closer to the discount model in key parts of their operations.
This may manifest in reducing similar items, increasing private label products, renegotiating with suppliers, reducing unproductive spaces, developing smaller branches, improving inventory management, and making everyday prices more competitive instead of relying excessively on temporary promotions.

In other words, hypermarkets will not become discount stores in name, but they may be forced to adopt the discipline of discount stores in operations and pricing.

The future is for the hybrid model

The upcoming battle is not just between a large store and a small store, but between two different models in managing cost and value.

Discount stores tell consumers:
We will provide your basic needs at a low price, in exchange for fewer options and services.
While hypermarkets say:
We will provide you with a wider range of options and a more integrated experience, but this increase must have real value that justifies what the customer pays.

If hypermarkets cannot prove this value, they will find themselves stuck between the costs of the large model and the prices of low-cost competitors.
However, if they redesign their operations, they may not need to transform into discount stores, but rather become more efficient and clear in the value they provide.

The question, then, is not: Will hypermarkets turn into discount stores?

The more precise question is: How much of their old model can they retain before the market forces them to rebuild their way of working?